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Abstract 
The  literature  on  strategic  alliances  has  deepened  our  understanding  of  the 
mechanisms  behind  their  formation.  This  literature  has  given  a  central  role  to 
complementarities between firms, whereby complementarities are usually measured 
by technological overlap. An established result tells us that, there is an inverted-u 
relationship between technological distance and learning by firms. In this paper, we 
argue that technological distance is only one aspect of complementarities. Equally 
important is the market distance, which we define as the extent to which the value 
generated by the alliance depends on the synergies between firms’ products. These 
synergies  may  occur  because  of  the  complementarities  between  products,  or  the 
possibilities to apply similar knowledge fields in different product domains. Through 
an agent based simulation study, we show that when firms consider both distances 
jointly, an alliance strategy which favours being close in at least one dimension yields 
the highest payoff, rather than being at the intermediate distance in both dimensions.  
                                                
♦ I thank Altay Ozaygen for helpful discussions, and for his suggestion of the Rayleigh distribution. INTRODUCTION 
The two central issues addressed in the literature on strategic alliances are, why firms 
form  alliances,  and  what  are  the  effects  of  alliances  on  firms’  performance.  In 
addressing these questions, probably the most widely accepted theoretical framework 
has  been  the  resource  based  view  (Pfeffer  and  Salancik,  1978)  which  explains 
alliances with respect to the complementarities in firm resources, and it has been 
confirmed  empirically  as  well  (Hagedoorn  1993;Walker  et  al.,  1997;  Shan  et  al., 
1994;  Mowery  et  al.,  1998;  Eisenhardt  and  Schoonhaven,  1996).  By  accessing 
complementary resources of others, firms have the chance to exploit their knowledge 
own bases, and explore distant knowledge lying outside their boundaries. Therefore, 
external  relations  are  an  important  source  of  developing  dynamic  capabilities 
(Schoenmakers  and  Duysters,  2006;  Powell  et  al.,  1996;  Rothaermel  and  Deeds, 
2004; Oliver, 2001).  
A body of empirical work on strategic alliances positions the firms in some 
notion of space, and measure motivations behind alliances with respect to the distance 
between firms in the defined space. Some commonly used notions of space has been 
geographical space (Gomes Casseres et al., 2006), cognitive space (Nooteboom et al. 
2007; Schoenmakers and Duysters, 2006), social space (Gulati, 2007) and strategic 
space (Garcia Pont and Nohria, 2001). Following this approach, in this paper, we 
analyze  both  the  formation  and  performance  effects  of  strategic  alliances  through 
positioning  firms  in  a  two  dimensional  space  defined  by  knowledge  and  market. 
Knowledge distance refers to the overlap between firms in terms of the technical 
knowledge they embody. Market distance, on the other hand, measures the extent of 
complementarities between products of firms. The starting point of this paper is that, 
the knowledge base of a firm is distinct from its product base, and both dimensions 
should be taken into account when trying to understand the patterns shaping strategic 
alliances. Therefore, we argue that focusing solely on technological distance, as it is 
done in most of the studies in this tradition, falls short of explaining a very important 
phenomena that many of the real world alliances reveal; the cases when there are 
strong opportunities for synergies between the product bases of firms, independent of their knowledge endowments. In this sense, we take exploration activities to be the 
firms’ search for the application of its knowledge in different product domains, rather 
than searching for distant partners in technical knowledge sphere, as most studies 
assume. In a similar manner, we take exploitation as the firms’ efforts to improve the 
way that it applies its knowledge to its current product domain.  
We perform an agent based simulation study in which firms are positioned in a two 
dimensional space defined by a technology address and a market address. Firms have 
different  preferences  when  they  are  selecting  partners,  depending  on  the  distance 
between them in both spaces. They collaborate, and their coordinates in this space 
change, as well as their profits. In this way, inter-firm networks form and evolve. We 
investigate  the  relation  between  firms’  distance  preferences  and  their  final  profit 
levels. We also analyze the networks that form during this process. We carry out four 
simulation  studies.  In  the  first,  firms  take  into  account  only  the  simple  Cartesian 
distance between them. In this model, we confirm the inverted-u relationship between 
cognitive  distance  and  learning,  which  is  an  established  result  in  the  literature 
(Mowery et al.,1998; and Duysters, 2006; Gilsing et al. 2008) . In the second model, 
firms take into account both dimensions separately in selecting partners. Our results 
show that those firms which prefer close connections in at least one dimension are 
more  successful.  In  other  words,  an  alliance  in  which  either  market  domain  or 
technology domain is distant proves to yield highest performance. We explain this 
result by referring to the established theory in creativity research, which underlines 
the importance of analogous thinking (Gassman and Zeschky, 2008) and recombinant 
innovation (Hargadon, 2003). Thirdly, we introduce an exogenous innovation in the 
model. The effect of an exogenous innovation is mostly on the network structure, and 
diffusion of firms in the market and knowledge space, in accordance with the findings 
of Baum et al. (2009). Finally, we modify the functional form employed, and test the 
robustness of the results. 
In this first section, the theoretical background is presented. The second section is 
devoted  to  the  explanation  of  the  model,  including  the  analytical  framework, 
assumptions and technical information on simulations.  The third section presents 
results and modifications of the model.  Fourth section includes some discussions and 
interpretations of the model, as well as some directions for future research.  BACKGROUND 
According  to  the  resource  based  view,  firms  form  alliances  to  make  use  of 
complementarities in their resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Wernerfelt, 1984). 
According to the knowledge based theory of the firm, which recognizes the most 
valuable resource of the firm to be knowledge (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Grant, 1996) 
complementarities in knowledge is the key aspect of alliances. Empirical studies in 
this tradition usually measure firm complementarities through employing the notion 
of knowledge distance between firms. In this section, we will first make an overview 
of this literature in relation to organizational learning. Afterwards, in building the 
theoretical background of the model, we will discuss why the notion of knowledge 
distance is not sufficient to have a meaningful measure of complementarities between 
firms.   
External Networks, Exploration and Exploitation 
Theoretically speaking, technological distance is usually taken as the overlap between 
the  knowledge  bases  of  firms  (Mowery  et  al.,  1998).  In  a  dynamic  capabilities 
framework, the knowledge bases of firms change through time, which can be through 
internal means, as firms carry out R&D activities to increase their absorptive capacity 
(Cohen  and  Levinthal,  1991)  and  through  external  means,  as  firms  explore  and 
exploit  knowledge  lying  outside  their  boundaries.  While  exploration  refers  to 
experimentation with new alternatives, exploitation aims at  refinement and extension 
of  existing  competencies,  technologies  and  paradigms  (March,  1991:  85). 
Traditionally  one  of  the  central  questions  in  organizational  learning  literature  has 
been, whether exploration and exploitation should be considered as the two ends of a 
spectrum, or whether they are orthogonal to each other (Gupta et al., 2006). While the 
former view implies a tradeoff between exploration and exploitation, the second view 
has  resulted  in  the  ambidexterity  hypothesis,  which  states  that  exploration  and 
exploitation are actually complements, and a mix of both types of external linkages are  provisioned  for  firms  for  increased  competitive  advantage  (Tushman  and 
O’Reilly, 1996; Levinthal and March, 1993; He and Wong, 2004). 
Empirical studies show that the choice between exploring and exploiting depends on 
the  external  conditions,  like  the  stage  in  the  industry  life  cycle  (Rothaermel  and 
Deeds, 2004), the growth phase of the firm (Oliver, 2001) and uncertainty (Beckman 
et al., 2004). During the beginnings of industry life cycles when there is technological 
turbulence, firms are more vulnerable with respect to an uncertain future. Evidence 
shows  that  exploration  activities,  through  accessing  distant  knowledge,  can  be  a 
source of competitive advantage (Rowley et al., 2000). In this way, firms increase 
their  chances to gain competence in different fields which maybe critical in future 
technologies and products.  
    While distant knowledge sources can be a source of competitive advantage in some 
cases, in more stable environments, having similar knowledge with alliance partners 
can be beneficial for competitive advantage. One of the cases which drive firms to 
proximate firms in the knowledge space is, when firms prefer to deepen their existing 
competences. Scholars have long argued that such exploitation activities take place in 
dense networks, characterized by embedded relations (Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 
1985) in which interactions are accompanied with thick knowledge exchange, face to 
face, and they help to build trust among the parties.  
The Optimal Technological Distance  
With  regards  to  the  relationship  between  distance  and  alliances,    a  major 
finding  in the literature is an inverted-u relationship  between technological distance 
between firms and learning (Mowery, 1998; Gilsing et al, 2008, Schoenmakers and 
Duysters, 2006; Nooteboom et al., 2007). Moreover this distance diminishes as firms 
interact with each other (Mowery et al., 1998). The underlying logic in this construct 
is simple; when firms are too close in the knowledge space, they have few to add to 
each  others  knowledge,  when  they  are  too  far,  they  cannot  access  each  others 
knowledge base, and learning is limited. This construct has become an attractive one 
for researchers in the theoretical and empirical spheres.  According  to  the  optimal  distance  hypothesis,  there  is  a  tradeoff  between 
establishing links with close firms and distant firms. An implicit assumption in this 
tradeoff is that, exploration and exploitation alliances are the two ends of a spectrum; 
therefore it suggests that learning will be maximized if firms find partners who are at 
the optimal distance. However, we argue that there are few problems with the linear 
perception assumed in the optimal distance formulation. Firstly, it implicitly assumes 
that exploration and exploitation activities are substitutes with each other. To cope 
with  this  issue,  researchers  have  sometimes  assumed  distinct  exploration  and 
exploitation  regimes  and  looked  at  the  optimal  distance  within  two  different 
frameworks (Nooteboom et al. 2007; Katila and Ahuja, 2002). Nevertheless assuming 
distinct exploration and exploitation regimes does not given an insight into how firms 
decide between exploration and exploitation at first hand.  
In addition, assuming a unique optimal distance between firms reduces the 
parameters involved in the complex search process to a single dimension, which is 
knowledge. In most of the cases, this functional relationship is detected through the 
analysis of patents (Mowery et al., 1998; Schoenmakers and Duysters, 2006; Katila 
and Ahuja, 2002), by looking at the overlap of patent fields, and/or citations between 
firms’ patents. While patent analysis is a useful one in many aspects, one should be 
careful in interpreting the results obtained through patent analysis. Notwithstanding 
the usual doubts concerned with patent analysis (Griliches, 1989), patents usually 
measure  the  codified  knowledge  of  firms,  and  do  not  measure  the  knowledge 
embedded in a tacit manner. Another problem is that, which subject matters will be 
included in a patent document sometimes depend on the patent strategy of the firm, 
and usually this decision is given by the people who are not themselves the inventors 
in the firm.
1
Finally, the most important problem associated with patent measures for the 
purposes  of  this  paper  is  that,  it  is  difficult  to  draw  a  distinction  between  the 
knowledge base and product base of firms, by looking solely at patents. Do patents 
measure  what  firms  know  or  what  firms  make?  One  of  the  most  important 
weaknesses  about  patents  when  measuring  complementarities  is  that,  they  do  not 
capture  the  complementarities  between  firms’  products,  which  seem  to  be  an 
                                                
1 This fact was pointed out to the author by one of the inventors in a large telecommunications firm. important driver of alliances. In the formation of alliances, it is not the knowledge of 
the partner that matters most, but rather, the possibilities the partner offers to the firm 
concerning  the  application  of  its  knowledge  in  connection  to  designing  different 
products. The main premise of this paper is that, exploration activities are in essence 
concerned with the search for different products in which firms existing competences 
can be applied in.  At the same time, exploitation involves, improving upon the way 
the firms’ knowledge is applied in a particular product domain. 
Complementarities between products of firms can be quite unrelated with their 
patent domains. To demonstrate the significance of the difference between knowledge 
and product domains, let us consider the alliance between Nike Inc. and Apple Inc., 
which  took  place  in  2005  to  develop  “smart  shoes”,  which  permits  various 
performance measures to be recorded digitally. Figure 1 shows the patent overlap 
between the two companies for their granted patents in 2002. There is little overlap 
between the two firms in terms of the subject matters of their patents; yet, the alliance 
was a success in terms of its innovative potential. Although the knowledge bases of 
these  two  firms  are  quite  distant,  their  products  had  a  high  potential  of 
complementarity. In this way, both firms explored successfully the possibilities of 
applying their competence in different market domains.       






























Figure 1. The patent domains of Nike Inc. and Apple Inc. 
At  this  point,  the  difference  between  cognitive  distance  and  technological 
distance seems critical. It has been argued that, cognitive distance is broader than knowledge  distance  (Wuyts  et  al.  2008  ),  which  incorporates  engineering  and 
marketing domains. However, because patent data is widely used, most of the studies 
are confined to the technology distance, ignoring the impact of synergies among the 
products.  
The Necessity to Include Market Distance in Measuring Complementarities 
In certain cases, firms ally with other firms because of the complementarities 
in the respective market domains. This is particularly marked in industries where 
there are strong network effects, where firms ally with each other to access each 
others’  installed  base,  and  to  strengthen  a  certain  standard  in  the  economy  (Hill, 
1997). ICT industry is an interesting one in this sense. Many of the products have a 
complementary aspect, where the value generated depends on the number of users 
who  adopts  a  technology  system  and  also  on  the  number  of  complementary 
technologies available.  Here, not only knowledge overlap between firms, but the 
extent to which consumers can derive additional value from using two technologies 
together is of prior concern for firms. For example during the 1980s, Intel’s product 
development strategy favoured the design of a modular PCI (peripheral component 
interface) to support the speed of its future microprocessors (Gawer and Cusumano, 
2002). The development of the PCI shaped the architecture of the dominant computer 
design. Chesbrough (2003) explains how Intel was allying with young and dynamic 
firms  who  could  strengthen  its  own  microprocessor  market  by  providing 
complementary  systems.  The  complementarities  in  knowledge  was  not  the  prior 
concern of Intel; rather, it aimed at establishing the PCI as a standard through its 
alliances, in which significant knowledge transfer between firms was taking place as 
well.  Complementarities  between  these  firms  existed  not  only  in  the  knowledge 
sphere, but also because of the synergy between firms spreading the PCI standard.  
Assuming a single type of distance between firms in measuring complementarities 
runs  the  risk  of  ignoring  the  distinction  between  market  domain  and  knowledge 
domain of firms. Two firms, which are close in market space  can be  very far in 
knowledge space, and two firms which are close in knowledge space, can be too far in market space. These two distances jointly determine the value that firms expect 
from their alliances.  
   To  summarize  our  discussions,  in  Figure  2,  we  demonstrate  the  strategic 
alliance formation motives with respect to two dimensions, as technological distance 
and market distance. Technological distance refers to the extent to which firms have 
common  technical  knowledge.  Market  distance  refers  to  the  extent  to  which 
consumers can increase the utility from utilizing the two firms’ products together.  
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Figure 2. Strategic Alliance motives in two dimensions: market distance and knowledge distance 
Box 1 shows the case in which two hypothetical firms have a high degree of 
technological overlap and market overlap. This usually corresponds to the case where 
firms are facing high competitive pressure from each other. Alliances can be formed 
with the objective of combining two complementary standards (Hill, 1997; Schilling 
and Hill, 1998). The alliance between Sony and Philips in 1989, for the common 
Compact Disc (CD) standard is a good example in this sense. Similarly, alliances can 
be  in  the  form  of  “good  will  relations”,  like  Microsoft  with  compatible  software 
providers for the Windows platform, or Sony’s relations with game developers for the 
Playstation platform (Schilling, 2002). In these relations, variety has a key role. These 
firms are close in their knowledge space, but through alliances, they have access to 
the variety offered by specialized firms, and hence they have the chance to strengthen 
























 Box  II refers to the case in which firms have similar technical knowledge 
bases, but in which they operate in different markets. The fact that a certain piece of 
knowledge can be reused in different contexts gives firms the opportunity to apply 
knowledge in different market domains. The history of computer industry is very 
remarkable  in  this  sense.  Continuous  collaborations  and  complex  relations  among 
people and firms in the beginning of the industry life cycle resulted in one piece of 
knowledge  being  applied  in  very  different  contexts  (Moggridge,  2007;  Campbell 
Kelly  and  Aspray,  2004).  Another  example  is,  when  government  funded  research 
finds applications in civilian industries; the defense sector being the most prominent 
case. Again, firms’ technical knowledge is similar, yet, the same knowledge finds 
different applications in different domains through alliances.  
    The Box III involves firms who are distant in their knowledge space, but whose 
products have strong complementary potential. In this case, competitive pressure is 
not high and there are also strong incentives to form collaborations. Apart from Nike 
and Apple example, here one can include the recent alliances between publication 
companies and software companies, in developing electronic versions of traditionally 
published media. 
2  In  1922, an alliance between the automobile manufacturer Ford 
Motor Company and Pilkington Brothers glass resulted in a process innovation for the 
continuous  production  of  large  pieces  of  sheet  glass  (Utterback,  1994).  Two 
companies  were  far  in  their  knowledge  space,  yet,  their  products  had  high 
complementary potential. 
It  is  possible  to  argue  that  there  is  a  high  potential  for  breakthrough 
innovations  in  the  1
st  and  3
rd  boxes.  Innovation  scholars  have  used  terms  like 
analogous  thinking  (Gassman  and  Zeschky,  2008)  or  recombinant  innovation 
(Hargadon and Sutton, 1996; Hargadon, 2003) for these cases, and in this paper we 
incorporate this perception of innovations into the strategic alliance framework. In 
these views, radical product innovations are seen as application of knowledge in one 
domain,  to  another  domain.  This  can  happen  between  firms  who  share  similar 
knowledge, but are involved in different applications, or among firms who satisfy 
related needs based on completely different knowledge domains. In both cases, there 
is scope for increased creativity, and successful new product development. Yet, we do 
                                                
2 The recent alliance between the Conde Nast and Adobe systems is an example.not have sufficient evidence that these aspects of complementarities between firms 
are adequately captured by patent data.  
Such a conceptualization of firm’s technological distance and market distance 
can be analyzed through an agent based simulation of strategic alliance formation of 
firms.  In this paper, we construct a theoretical  model to analyze the performance 
effects of strategic alliances based on the motives presented herein. In particular, our 
objectives are as follows. With this theoretical model, first we aim to confirm the 
optimal  distance  hypothesis,  when  firms  consider  only  a  single  distance  between 
them.  Second,  we  aim  to  show  the  performance  outcome  when  firms  give  their 
decisions  under  a  two  dimensional  space.  When  firms  make  decisions  under  two 
dimensions, does the optimal distance hypothesis still hold? In other words, do firms 
form alliances in intermediate distance under two dimensions? We also aim to look at 
the evolution of networks between firms, as they interact with each other under the 
two  dimensional  space.    Finally  we  investigate  these  issues,  when  there  is  an 
exogenous innovation in the system.  
THE MODEL 
A Brief Description of the Model 
    In  the  model,  there  is  a  randomly  located  population  of  firms  on  the  two 
dimensional Cartesian space (Baum et al., 2009). Theoretically speaking, the distance 
between firms can be interpreted in any context, and the idea behind the model is that, 
firms search for partners in this space considering the distance between them. First, 
we  consider  the  case  when  firms  give  decisions  taking  into  account  the  simple 
Cartesian  distance.  Second,  we  look  at  the  case  when  firms  search  for 
complementarities in two different dimensions, rather than a single dimension as is 
usually taken in the literature.  
The firms are idiosyncratic in their choices; some of them may prefer close 
firms in the two dimensions, and some of them may prefer distant connections in the 
two, and others may fall in between. Through a matching process described below, 
firms  form  alliances  by  forming  pairs.  The  effect  of  a  performing  an  alliance  is 
twofold,  first  firms  earn  profits,  and  second  their  location  in  the  Cartesian  space 
changes; they become closer to their partners (Baum et al., 2009). The fact that after 
collaboration they become closer in space  restricts the possible interpretations we might make about these dimensions. For example, we cannot interpret it as physical 
distance,  since  it  would  imply  that  firms  change  their  geographical  space  after 
alliance,  which  is  more  unlikely.  In  this  context,  market  complementarity  and 
knowledge complementarity fit reasonably within the model.  
With  the  updated  levels  of  profits  and  their  new  location,  the  above 
procedures  are  repeated.  We  look  at  the  structure  of  networks  that  emerge,  and 
analyze the relationship between firm preferences and final profit levels. In short, can 
we identify a relationship between the strategy of the firm and its realized profits? 
What type of partner selection strategy brings highest gains?  
Before collaboration: Partner Preferences 
   
 Each firm has a location in the Cartesian space given by  i m  and  i k  showing 
its  market  address  and  knowledge  address  respectively.    The  profits  that  firm  i 
expects from its collaboration with firm j ,  ) ( ij ij d π , depends on the distance between 
them. Distance is simple Cartesian distance, given by 
2 2 ) ( ) ( j i j i ij k k m m d − + − = . 
Profit Function 
The profit function that we use needs to have the following properties in line 
with  our  assumptions.  First,  we  assume  that  each  firm  has  a  different  strategy 
concerning how it selects partners. The strategy of firms are shaped by their profit 
expectations. Some firms expect to gain highest profits through connecting to close 
firms, and some firms prefer distant connections. Nevertheless, deviations from its 
perceived optimal distance does not imply that it will not ally with other firms. In this 
sense, we assume an inverted-u relationship between expected profits and distance. 
Deviations from the optimal distance will reduce the expected profits of the firm. 
Second, we assume that distant connections are more costly, because of increased 
costs of communication and higher risks of partnership. Moreover, expected profits 
from distant connections are more uncertain, which makes it difficult to judge among 
firms who are in more or less the same distance from the focal firm. Finally, these 
properties should be captured via a simple function to make the simulation easy to control.  These  properties  are  satisfied  with  the  Rayleigh  probability  distribution 



















Figure 3. The Rayleigh Distribution 
In Figure 3, profits are given as a function of distance between firms. For a 
fixed σ, there is an optimal distance between two firms, which maximizes profits. But 
changing the value of σ permits us to model the different preferences of firms in 
terms of distance. As σ  increases, two things happen: First, the peak of the function 
reduces, which means that the maximum profits expected by high-σ firms are less 
then the maximum profits expected by low-σ firms. But at the same time, the set of 
firms among which firms chose expands as σ grows. 
3  Moreover, as we explain in 
the next section, when firms connect to distant partners, their post alliance movement 
is higher in the Cartesian space. In accordance with this function, the profits that firm 
i expects from its collaboration with firm j is given by: 
                                                









− =                                  (1) 
Where,  ij d  is the distance between them, and  i σ is the distance preference parameter 
for firm i, which is fixed and different for each firm.  
After Collaboration 
                                                
3 Because the function is a probability distribution function, the total area under the curves are the 
same, which means that expected total profits are the same for all firms regardless of their σ.  We 
release this assumption in the last section.  We assume that, firms come closer to each other in the industry space after a 
partnership  (Baum  et  al,  2009).  In  forming  their  profit  expectations  before 
collaboration, they foresee their change of location, and include a loss term in their 
expectation function, depending on the crowdedness of their new position. If the final 
point that they arrive is occupied by a number of other firms in the close vicinity, 
competitive  pressure  would  increase,  which  we  assume  has  a  negative  effect  on 
expected profits. Hence, the  ij
e L  attempts to capture this effect by taking into account 
where  the  firm  expects  to  find  itself  if  the  partnership  is  materialized.  Then  we 
modify the profit function as follows: 
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π                                        (2) 
The new locations of firm i, after its collaboration with firm j is given by: 
                                              ) ( 1 j i it it m m m m − + = − α                                            (3) 
) ( 1 j i it it k k k k − + = − α
And the realized profits, if firms i and j match with each other is:  
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π                                      (4) 
It is important to mention that, firm i cannot predict precisely its profits in advance 
because  the  realized  profits  depend  on  the  partnerships  formed  by  other  firms.  If 
many firms move to a similar location, the realized losses can be more than expected. 
Matching 
    Based on Eq. (2), each firm calculates its expected profits from collaboration with 
each of the other firms. The matching process that we use is based on the Gale and 
Shapley (1962), and have been previously used in agent based simulations (Cowan et 
al., 2007; Ozman, 2010). Two firms form a partnership, if and only if their mutual 
profit expectations are higher than the rest of the available partners, and their mutual 
expectations do not differ by more than a certain percentage. 
4 After matching takes 
                                                
4  In  this  model,  the  mutual  profit  expectations  are  not  the  same  (what  firm  i  expects  from  its 
collaboration with j, and what j expects from i), because their distance preferences might be different. place, the coordinates of firm i changes according to Eq. (3) and  realized profits are 
calculated according to Eq. (4).  
Assumptions     
It  is  important  to  clarify  our  main  assumptions.  Firstly,  we  assume  a 
heterogeneous  population  of  firms  where  they  have  different  criteria  in  selecting 
partners. In an implicit way, we exclude environmental conditions which may lead 
firms to behave in similar ways. Nevertheless, this is also the strength of this model, 
since  it  permits  us  to  include  inter-industry  alliances.  In  addition,  because  firms’ 
distance preference parameters are set randomly, some firms are similar to each other. 
So  there  are  group  of  firms  who  find  it  more  beneficial  to  be  close  in  both 
dimensions, etc. 
    Second we assume that losses are incurred because of the crowdedness of the area 
in which the firm finds itself in, after the alliance. Especially in rapidly changing 
environments, after the alliance the firm may find itself in a position in which it did 
not foresee before, and receive more, or less profits than what it expected initially. 
    Thirdly we assume that the profits fall as distance increases. This assumption is 
based on the fact that, distant connections are more costly in terms of communication, 
and uncertainty, but the firms have more alternative partners to select among. At the 
same  time,  distant  connections  make  firms  move  more  in  the  space,  the  distance 
between their initial location and post alliance location is bigger.   
RESULTS AND MODIFICATIONS 
Simulations and Parameters 
    The population consists of N=100 firms. The coordinates of firm i in period t=0 is 
drawn  from  a  uniform  distribution  such  that    ( i m , i k )∈  [0,10].  The  distance 
preference  parameter  is  given  as  ∈ i σ [0.1,4]  and  for  100  firms,  we  increase  it 
                                                                                                                                           
When  firms  have the  same  expectations, a commonly employed  matching process can be seen in 
Cowan et al. (2007). Here, we slightly modify this algorithm, such that if the ratio of their profit 
expectations differ by less than 0.9, they do not form a partnership. We impose this constraint so as to 
make sure that a firm which prefers a distant partner is not likely to collaborate with a firm who prefers 
a close partner during matching.  incrementally in the first set of simulations.
5 The parameter measuring the amount of 
distance travelled after the  collaboration is ￿=0.05. The amount of loss is given by, 
{} { } 1 : i \ # < ∈ = ij ij d N j L  which states that loss incurred is the number of firms which 
are within a unit of distance from firm i. We run 10 simulations. In each simulation, 
we keep the distance preference parameter (σ ) of firm i fixed, but assign a different 
beginning coordinate for the firm. In this way we have the chance to confirm that the 
results do not depend on the initial position of firms in the space, and we can isolate 
the  effect  of  preference  parameter  on  profits.  There  are  1000  periods  in  one 
simulation run. The results presented are the average profit levels of firms for the 10 
different runs. In the model, there are only bilateral links in a single period, but after 
1000 periods, we obtain a network (Cowan et al., 2007) through the accumulation of 
relations.  The  network  measures  shown  in  the  Appendix  are  based  on  the  final 
networks.
6
In Figure 4, we show the distance preference paramater (σ ) with respect to 
the final profits. It reveals that, the highest profits belong to the firms who prefer 
partners  at  an  intermediate  distance.  This  result  confirms    the  optimal  distance 
hypothesis which detects an inverted-u relationship between learning and knowledge 
distance. Why is this result obtained from this model? The analytical interpretation is 
as follows. Due to the fact that firms move towards each other after collaboration, 
firms  who  prefer  close  partners  can  move  only  little,  and  their  set  of  available 
partners do not change significantly as periods elapse. Firms who prefer very distant 
partners  move  a  lot,  but  distant  connections  are  more  costly  by  our  initial 
assumptions.  This  is  why  it  is  possible  to  confirm  the  optimal  cognitive  distance 
hypothesis.  Nevertheless,  our  main  question in this  paper  is  concerned  with  what 
happens when firms consider two distances  separately and give different weight to 
market closeness and knowledge closeness when forming their decisions? In the next 
section we release the assumption of a unique σ for firm i.  
                                                
5 This means that the firm who prefers closest connections has a σ=0.1 and the firm which prefers most 
distant connection has a σ=4.
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Figure 4: Profits and distance preference parameter
Modification 1: Distinguishing between Market and Knowledge Dimensions  
In this section we modify the model, so that, the profits that firm i expects 
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Eq. (5) is a simple modification of Eq. (2) where distance is decomposed into its two 
constituents. According to Eq. (5), expected profits from collaboration with firm j has 
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losses expected due to the change in the location of the firm, which depends  on the 
crowdedness  of  the  new  location.  In  Eq.  (5), 
m
i σ and 
k
i σ are  firm  i’s  distance 
preference parameter in market and knowledge domains respectively. The distance 
between firms in the market and knowledge dimensions are given by 
m
ij d  and 
k
ij d and 
they are simple Cartesian distances taken separately in both dimensions:  
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ij m m d − =                                     (6) 
j i
k
ij k k d − =Therefore  each  firm  i  is  characterized  by  two  features.  First  its  location  in  the 
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i σ ). For example, a firm who prefers distant market connections, and 
close knowledge connections will have 
m
i σ > 
k
i σ . These two features are assigned 
randomly  to  firms  in  the  beginning  period.  We  hold  all  the  parameters  of  the 





i σ )∈[0.1,4]  and  for  100  firms,  we  determine  them  randomly  drawn  from  a 





i σ ) of firm i the same, but assign a different beginning coordinate for 
the firms. The results presented are the average profit levels of firms for the 10 runs.  





i σ ). The size of the bubbles show the final profit levels achieved after 1000 
periods elapse. The results reveal that, firms who prefer partners who are close in at 
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Figure 5 Profits and Distance Preference Parameters: spread of firms
One of the questions of interest is the relation between the number of partners 
of the firm, its strength of connections and its final profit levels.  Here, connection 
strength refers to the average number of times two firms interact with each other. The 
firm’s degrees refer to the number of different partners of the firm. Our results reveal 
                                                
7 Note that, the highest profits in the optimal intermediate distance in both dimensions would have 
been revealed by biggest bubbles in the middle of the graph.   that, agents in the range of maximum profits also have high connection strength as 
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Figure 6 Strength of Ties (a), degrees (b) and Distance preference parameter 
Comparison of Figure 5 and 6a and 6b reveal that, there is a positive relation 
between  strength  of  relations  and  profits,  and  only  a  weak  relation  between  the 
degrees and profits. In other words, firms with high profits are also the ones who 
repeat their ties with their partners.   Some further selected network measures are 
shown in the Appendix.  
Figure 7 shows the physical location of firms  at the end of the simulation runs.
8
Absent new entries, firms converge to each other in the Cartesian space, therefore 
after a while, their losses exceed their profits and they can no longer find partners 
sufficiently profitable and/or, who is equally willing to form partnership with them. In 
other words, firms become so similar to each other in the market and knowledge 
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8 Because initial coordinates are different for each of the 10 simulations, the final coordinates are also 
different. Therefore we show only one of the simulations here, as an example of convergence.  Figure 7 Final coordinates of the firms (scale between 4 and 6) 
Modification 2: External Innovation 
In the third set of simulations, we introduce an external innovation, in which 
each firms in each period has a 0.1% probability of a random change in its location.  
Figure 8 shows the final profits in the space defined by distance preference 
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Figure 8 Profits and Distance Preference Parameters: spread of firms when there is an external 
innovation 
While the structure of the relation between market and knowledge preference 
and profits do not change, as revealed by the comparison of Figures 5 and 8, the 
introduction of an external innovation reduces convergence in physical locations. 
There are opportunities for the formation of new partnerships continuously. As 
expected, firms are more spread in the market and knowledge space, and convergence 
is much less when there is external innovation. Figure 9 shows the new coordinates of 
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Figure 9 Final market and knowledge locations of firms (scale between 1 and 8) Modification 3: Profit Function 
One of the assumptions we made above was that distant connections are more 
costly, so that the maximum expected profits are less, as distance grows (Eq. 1 and 
Figure  2).  In  this  section,  we  release  this  assumption,  and  assume  the  following 
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Figure 10 Modified Profit Function 
Figure 11 shows the profit levels in the distance preference space. Firms who 
prefer distant partners in both dimensions are not profitable. Firms who prefer too 
close connections in only one dimension are also not profitable. In this case, the 
highest payoffs belong to firms who are at a more or less intermediate location in at 
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m
)DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The beginning point of this paper is the need to incorporate the concept of 
market  distance  into  the  analysis  of  strategic  alliances.  In  the  literature, 
complementarities  between  firms  are  usually  measured  by  considering  a  single 
dimension as technological distance. Studies show that there is an optimal distance 
between firms which maximizes learning. Being too close in knowledge space is not 
useful, since firms cannot add anything new to their existing knowledge. Being too 
far  is  also  not  useful,  because  firms  have  difficulty  in  understanding  each  other. 
While this result has proven to be very useful in understanding alliances, it falls short 
of explaining those in which firms who are very distant in their knowledge domains 
can explore opportunities to apply their knowledge in different market domains. In 
other  words,  focusing  only  on  knowledge  distance  reduces  the  complex  search 
process into a single dimension. In explaining the generation of novelties from distant 
connections this issue has been recognised by most scholars, however, it has not been 
tackled adequately in models incorporating only technological distance. Moreover, 
the detection of an inverted-u relationship between distance and learning has mostly 
been  done  through  analysis  of  patents.  How  well  patent  data  captures 
complementarities between firms in the market domain is questionable, and should be 
subject to more rigorous research in the future. Explaining alliances can be better 
done by taking into account not only the cognitive distance between firms, but also 
the extent to which their products can be consumed jointly. We define the latter as 
market  distance  in  this  paper.  Our  results  show  that  there  is  a  complementarity 
between both dimensions, firms need to be close in at least one dimension for higher 
profitability, rather than being in the intermediate distance in the two dimensions.  
In this paper, we perform an agent based simulation, to reveal the complex 
dynamics involved in the partner selection process. The abstract notion of the two 
dimensions that we use can be replaced by other notions of distance, in which firms 
come closer to each other after collaboration. Other studies show that as firms learn 
from  each  other  through  alliances,  the  overlap  between  their  capabilities  increase 
(Mowery et al., 1998; Baum et al., 2009). We prefer to focus on knowledge and market proximity, because they fit nicely in the model as firms come closer to each 
other after collaboration, and as firms converge finally in the market and technology 
domains. Secondly, we prefer to choose market distance, since we are convinced that 
market distance has not received sufficient attention in explaining alliances, while 
many of the real world alliances seem to be motivated by complementarities between 
the products of firms.  
Market and knowledge dimensions have been explored in different ways in 
previous  literature.  For  example,  Cotterman  et al.(2009)  find  that,  in  firms  where 
there is a high communication between market and knowledge aspects perform better 
(Cotterman  et  al.,  2009).  The  inability  of  large  R&D  labs  to  commercialize  their 
highly  sophisticated  scientific  knowledge  is  also  an  issue  covered  in  the  strategic 
management literature. Some scholars stress the need to open the innovation process 
to  make  use  of  external  knowledge  lying  outside  firm  boundaries,  to  be  able  to 
commercialize their dormant technical knowledge  (Chesbrough, 2003).  
Through a simple analytical model, we show that when firms consider only a 
single distance between them, there exists an optimal intermediate distance, which 
maximizes profits. Introducing a second decision parameter, however, changes the 
results. When firms consider two dimensions in selecting partners, we show that the 
firms who prefer close partners in at least one dimension have higher payoffs. This 
result seems to be quite robust. When we change the functional form employed, the 
only  change  was  that,  firms  who  prefer  intermediate  connections  in  at  least  one 
dimension had higher payoffs.  
We  interpret  our    results  by  considering  industries  where  complementarity 
between  products  is  an  important  feature  of  competitive  advantage.  Real  world 
examples  in  new  product  development  alliances  demonstrate  the  importance  of 
market overlap between firms, as a driver of alliances, and their performance effects. 
Our results seem to fit very well into the literature on the role of analogical thinking 
(Gassman and Zeschky, 2008) and recombinant innovation (Hargadon, 2003) in new 
product development literature. Gassman and Zeschky (2008) provide a case study 
explaining how four companies used analogous thinking to solve problems, and they 
emphasize  the  importance  of  search  process  in  external  relations.  History  of 
technological  change  is  full  of  examples  in  which  knowledge  developed  in  one context is applied in other contexts to solve problems (Arthur, 2009; Bassala, 1988). 
For  example,  as  early  as  1922,  when  the  enclosed  automobile  was  becoming 
fashionable,  an  alliance  between  Ford  Motor  Company  and  Pilkington  Brother’s 
glass,  an  established  UK  glass  firm,  resulted  in  the  continuous  glass  production 
process, which combined casting and annealing in a single production chain. The two 
companies were largely disconnected as far as their competences were concerned; 
nevertheless,  the  fact  that  the  mass  production  of  the  automobile  required  large 
supply of high quality glass brought them closer in the market space. The production 
time of a sheet of polished glass was reduced from 10 days to three days thought the 
Ford Pilkington glass process (Utterback, 1994).  
IBM’s leader position in the computer industry was very effective in the shift 
from 150 mm to 200 mm wafers, used in the fabrication of integrated circuits. IBM 
was collaborating with major equipment suppliers and invested heavily in research to 
this end. Having early access to a critical equipment resulted in an active role in 
setting  standards,  which  was  the  source  of  competitive  advantage  in  the  market 
(Chesbrough, 2003). The collaboration of IBM with suppliers was not because these 
firms were at an intermediate distance in terms of their technical knowledge, rather it 
was because, these firms were critical in the establishment of PC standard with the 
complementary technologies they were specialized at producing. Another example 
can be given from medical equipment industry. Schilling (2008) explains that the 
collaboration between a variety of actors from distinct areas, one of them being from 
the defence industry, resulted in the introduction of the first swallowable camera pills 
to the market in April 2000. The spillovers between military technologies and civilian 
industries  is  an  important  case  in  which  actors  from  distinct  industries  join  their 
knowledge to find applications of knowledge in a variety of market needs. Even in 
the early phases of the computer industry, the necessity to process large amounts of 
data in short time period in US Census Bureau initiated the development of punch 
cards, which later lay the basis of computers for civilian use (Campbell Kelly and 
Aspray, 1996). Perhaps the computer industry is one of the cases in which the joint 
effect of knowledge and markets is the most striking. Looking at the history of the 
industry,  actors  knowledgeable  in  one  context  were  finding  applications  of  their 
knowledge to meet different market needs (Moggridge, 2007; Steinmuller, 2007). Davis  et  al.  (2007)  provide  an  excellent  analysis  of  the  contexts  in  which 
simulation models can be used safely in management research in developing theories. 
They state that simulations permit testing simple theories, especially when complex 
dynamics are involved. In this sense, our model is no exception. This simple model 
incorporates complex dynamics involved in firm networks. Intuitively, and based on 
examples from the real world, our results seem to fit very well into most of firm 
alliances especially in new product development. Nevertheless, we believe that more 
formal  empirical  research  is  complementary  to  simulation  models,  and  this  paper 
opens up  direction for future research in which not only knowledge overlap but also 
market overlap is considered in understanding complementarities between firms.  REFERENCES 
Arthur, B. 2009. The Nature of Technology. Free Press. 
Basalla,  G.  1988.  The  Evolution  of  Technology.  Cambridge  University  Press. 
Cambridge.  
Baum,  J.,  Cowan,  R.,  Jonard,  N.  2009.  Network  Independent  Partner  Selection 
Academy of Management Proceedings. 1-6.  
Beckman, C.M., Haunschild, P.R. and Philips, D.J. 2004.  Friends or Strangers? 
Firm  specific  uncertainty,  Market  uncertainty  and  Network  partner  selection. 
Organization Science, 15(3): 259-275.  
Campbell-Kelly M. and William A. 1996. Computer: A history of the information 
machine, BasicBooks Press, New York. 
Chesbrough,  H.  2003  .Open  Innovation:  The  New  Imperative  for  Creating  and 
Profiting from Technology. Harvard Business School Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Cohen and Levinthal. 1990. Absorptive capacity: A new perspective on learning and 
innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly. 35(1): 128-152. 
Coleman,  J.S.  1988.  Social  Capital  in  the  Creation  of  Human  Capital.  American 
Journal of Sociology, 94: 95-120. 
Cotterman, R. , Fusfeld, A., Henderson, P., Leder, J., Loweth, C. , Metoyer, A. 2009. 
Aligning  Marketing  and  Technology  to  Drive  Innovation.  Research  Technology 
Management.  
Cowan,  R.,  Jonard,  N.,  Zimmerman,  J.B.  2007.  Bilateral  Collaboration  and  the 
Emergence of Innovation Networks. Management Science, 53(7): 1051-1067. Davis, J., Eisenhardt, K., Bingham, C. 2007. Developing Theory through Simulation 
Methods. Academy of Management Review. 32(2): 480-499. 
Eisenhardt, K.M. and Schoonhoven, C.B. 1996. Resource-Based View of Strategic 
Alliance  Formation:  Strategic  and  Social  Effects  in  Entrepreneurial  Firms. 
Organization Science, 7(2): 136-150. 
Gale, D., Lloyd S. 1962. College admissions and the stability of marriage. American 
Mathematical Monthly, 69: 9-15. 
Garcia Pont, C. and Nohria, N. 2002. Local versus Global Mimetism; The Dynamics 
of Alliance Formation in the Automobile Industry. Strategic Management Journal, 23: 
307-21. 
Gassman, O. and Zeschky, M. 2008. Opening up the Solution Space: The Role of 
Analogical Thinking for Breakthrough Product Innovation. Creativity and Innovation 
Management. 17(2): 97-106. 
Gawer, A. and Cusumano, M. 2002. Platform Leadership, Harvard Business School 
Press.  
Gilsing,  V.,  Nooteboom,  B.,  Haverbeke,  W.,  Duysters,  G  and  Oord,  A.  2008. 
Network  Embeddedness  and  the  exploration  of  novel  technologies:  technological 
distance, betweeness centrality and density, Research Policy, 37: 1717-1731: 
Gomes-Casseres,  B.,  Hagedoorn,  J.  and  Jaffe,  A.  .2006.  Do  Alliances  Promote 
Knowledge Flows? Journal of Financial Economics, 80(2).  
Granovetter, M.S. 1973. The Strength of Weak Ties. American Journal of Sociology, 
78(6): 1360-80. Grant, Robert M. 1996. Towards a knowledge based theory of the firm', Strategic 
Management Journal, 17: 109-122. 
Griliches,  Z.  1988.  Patent  Statistics  as  Economic  Indicators:  A  SurveyNo  3301, 
NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research.  
Hagedoorn, J. 1993 .Understanding the Rationale of Strategic Technology Partnering: 
Inter-organizational Modes of Cooperation and Sectoral Differences. Strategic 
Management Journal, 14: 371-85. 
Hargadon, A. 2003. How Breakthroughs Happen. Harvard University Press. Boston 
Massachustes.  
Hargadon, A. and Sutton, R. 1997. Technology brokering and innovation in a product 
development firm. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42(4): 716-749.  
He, Z. And Wong, P. 2004. Exploration vs. Exploitation: An Empirical Test of the 
Ambidexterity Hypothesis, Organization Science, 15(4): 481-494. 
Hill,  C.  1997.  Establishing  a  Standard:  competitive  strategy  and  technological 
standards in winner-take-all industries, Academy of Management Executive, 11(2): 7-
25. 
Katila,  R.  and  Ahuja,  G.  2002.  Something  Old,  Something  New:  A  Longitudinal 
Study of Search Behaviour and New Product Introduction. Academy of Management 
Journal, 45(6) 1183-1194. 
Kogut, B. and Udo Z. 1992 `Knowledge of the firm, combinative capabilities and 
replication of new technology', Organization Science, 3(3): 383-97. 
Levinthal,  D.  A.  and  March  J.  G.  1993  The  Myopia  of  Learning,  Strategic 
Management Journal Vol 14 95-112. March,  J.  1991  .Exploration  and  Exploitation  in  Organizational  Learning. 
Organization Science, 2: 71-87. 
Moggridge, B. 2007. Designing interactions, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
MIT Press. 
Mowery  D.C.,  Oxley,  J.E.  and  Silverman,  B.S.  1998.  Technological  Overlap  and 
Interfirm  Cooperation:  Implications  for  the  Resource  Based  View  of  the  Firm. 
Research Policy, 27: 507-23. 
Nooteboom,  B.,  Haverbeke,  W.,  Duysters,  G.,  Gilsing,  W.  And  Oord,  A.  2007, 
Optimal  Cognitive  Distance  and  Absorptive  Capacity,  Research  Policy,36:  1016-
1034. 
Oliver, A. 2001.  Strategic Alliances and the Learning Life-Cycle of Biotechnology 
Firms. Organization Studies, 22(3): 467-489. 
Pfeffer, J. and Salancik, G. 1978. The External Control of Organisations: A Resource 
Dependence Perspective, New York: Harper and Row. 
Powell,  W.W.,  Koput,  K.W.  and  Smith-Doerr,  L.  1996.  Interorganizational 
Collaboration and the Locus of Innovation: Networks of Learning in Biotechnology. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 41:116-145. 
Rothaermel, F.T.  and Deeds, D.L. 2004. Exploration and Exploitation Alliances in 
Biotechnology:  A  System  of  New  Product  Development,  Strategic  Management 
Journal, 25: 201-221.  
Rowley, T., Behrens, D. and Krackhardt, D. 2000. Redundant Governance Structures: 
An  Analysis  of  Structural  ad  Relational  Embeddedness  in  the  Steel  and 
Semiconductor Industries, Strategic Management Journal, 21:369-86.   
Schilling, M.A. and Hill, C.W.L. 1998. Managing the new product development 
process: Strategic imperatives. Academy of Management Executive, 12(3):67-81. ...
Schilling, M. 2008. Strategic Management of Technological Innovation, Mc Graw 
Hill, Singapore. 
Schoenmakers,  W.  And  Duysters,  G.  2006.  Learning  in  Strategic  Technology 
Alliances. Technology Analysis and Strategic Management, 18(2) 245-264.  
Shan, W., G. Walker; Kogut, B. 1994. Interfirm Cooperation and Startup Innovation 
in the Biotechnology Industry Strategic Management Journal, 15(5): 387-394. 
Steinmuller, E. 2007. The economics of ICTs: Building blocks and implications, R. 
Mansell, C. Avgerou and D. Quah (Eds.),  The Oxford handbook of information and 
communication technologies, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Tushman, M.L. and O’Reilly III, C.A. 1996. Ambidextrous Organizations: Managing 
Evolutionary and Revolutionary Change, California Management Review, 3(4).  
Utterback,  J.M.  1996.  Mastering  the  Dynamics  of  Innovation.  Harvard  Business 
School Press. Boston Massachusets.  
Walker, G., Kogut B. and Shan W. 1997. Social Capital Structural Holes and the 
Formation of an Industry Network. Organization Science, 8(2): 109. 
Wernerfelt, B. 1984. A Resource-Based View of the Firm. Strategic Management 
Journal, 5(2): 171-180. APPENDIX 
Selected Network Measures 
Figures A1 and A2 show the evolution of selected network measures in the model 
described in Modifications 2. First, we show the cliquishness of the networks, which 
shows  the  extent  to  which  partners  of  a  firm  are  also  partners  with  each  other. 
Secondly, we show the average degree centrality of networks and the average shortest 
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Figure A2 Average Degrees of a Firm 
In the final networks on the average  50% of neighbors of a firm are connected with 
each other (Figure A1), and on the average 2.21 intermediate firms are needed to link 
any two firms in the space (Figure A1). The average degrees are shown in Figure A2, 
and it means that, each firm connects to 20% of other firms in the market knowledge 
space. Figure A3 shows the cliquishness, degree centrality and average shortest path length 
when  there  is  an  external  innovation,  given  in  Modification  3.  Cliquishness  and 
degree centrality are slightly higher than the case with no innovation. The shortest 
path length after 1000 periods, which is given in Figure A3 is 1.95 which is lower 
than the case with no innovation.  Figure A4 shows the average degrees of firms, 
which reveals that after 1000 periods, each firm, on the average has connected to 35% 
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Figure A4 Average degrees per firm with external innovation 
Comparison  of  the  networks  in  both  cases  reveal  that,  when  there  is  an  external 
innovation, the network approaches a complete one, where all firms are connected to 
all other firms. Nevertheless this is not shown in the model, since it requires more 
than  1000  periods.      This  is  an  expected  result,  since  when  there  is  an  external 
innovation, random dislocation of firms result in the fact that they do not converge 
(see Figure 9 in the main text), and can always find profitable partners to collaborate 
with.   
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